The theory of motivated reasoning suggests that, in legal decisions, different judges will assess the same information differently, depending on their backgrounds and fundamental values. Attitudinalists [theorists who contend that judges’ decisions are driven by their own policy preferences] have concurred thorns their findings on ideological decision making could be explained by the “human reflex” to “convince oneself of the propriety of what one prefers to believe—motivated reasoning.”

Motivated reasoning, however, is subject to “reasonableness constraints.” For example, the accuracy of decision making is enhanced when the stakes for the decision are higher, when the decision must be justified, and when the decision will be made public. Such circumstances often apply to judicial decisions. The presence of stronger arguments contrary to preferences reduces the influence of motivations. The limitations of the power of motivated reasoning are apparent from the numerous unanimous opinions of the United States Supreme Court [whose members generally represent a range of ideological predispositions] and other cases in which justices appear to vote contrary to their ideological preferences. One would anticipate that the influence of such motivated reasoning is at its apex when the law is relatively less determinate, which is consistent with the findings of empirical research.